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Abstract 
W hen we work with information from mul­
tiple sources, the formalism each employs to 
handle uncertainty may not be uniform. In 
order to be able to combine these knowl­
edge bases of different formats, we need to 
first establish a common basis for character­
izing and evaluating the different formalisms, 
and provide a semantics for the combined 
mechanism. A common framework can pro­
vide an infrastructure for building an inte­
grated system, and is essential if we are to 
understand its behavior. We present a uni­
fying framework based on an ordered par­
tition of possible worlds called partition se­
quences, which corresponds to our intuitive 
notion of biasing towards certain possible sce­
narios when we are uncertain of the actual 
situation. We show that some of the ex­
isting formalisms, namely, default logic, au­
toepistemic logic, probabilistic conditioning 
and thresholding (generalized conditioning), 
and possibility theory can be incorporated 
into this general framework. 
1 INTRODUCTION 
Many different formalisms have been proposed for 
dealing with reasoning under uncertainty. These 
include default logic [Reiter, 1980], autoepistemic 
logic [Moore, 1985], circumscription [McCarthy, 19801, 
probability, belief [Dempster, 1967; Shafer, 1976], and 
possibility theory [Zadeh, 1978; Dubois and Prade, 
1988]. 
Each formalism has its own idea of how uncertainty 
in a knowledge base should be handled, and each has 
provided a different solution. Typically a formalism is 
characterized using distinct and exclusive syntax and 
semantics, which are not directly compatible to those 
of other formalisms, making it difficult to make mean­
ingful comparisons on common terms. 
When we work with information from multiple sources, 
the formats of the knowledge bases and the systems 
they adopt to express uncertainty may not be uniform. 
It would be desirable to be able to, for example, com­
bine a knowledge base of default rules with one con­
taining autoepistemic formulas and a third one con­
taining probability assignments. To do so we need 
to first establish a common basis for characterizing 
and evaluating the different formalisms, and provide 
a semantics specifying how the default rules, autoepis­
temic formulas, and probabili ty statements can be 
combined and allowed to interact. A common frame­
work can provide an infrastructure for building an inte­
grated ;;y;;tem, and is essential if we are to understand 
and "debug" the behavior of the resulting system. 
We propose a unifying framework based on an ordered 
partition of possible world;;. We call such structures 
partition sequences. A p artition sequence corresponds 
to our intuitive notion of biasing towards certain pos­
sible scenarios when we are uncertain of the actual sit­
uation. This framework can be adapted to character­
ize different formalisms by imposing formalism-specific 
constraints on the way the set of possible worlds can 
be partitioned. We demonstrate the mechanism by in­
corporating into the general framework some of the ex­
isting formalisms, namely, default logic, autoepistemic 
logic, probabilistic conditioning and thresholding (gen­
eralized conditioning), and possibility theory. 
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Sec­
tion 2 presents the basic framework of possible world 
partition sequence. Section 3 gives a brief summary of 
default logic, autoepistemic logic, probabilis tic condi­
tioning and thresholding, and possibility theory . Sec­
tion 4 gives the details on how the framework can 
be adapted to these formalisms. Section 5 concludes 
the discussion. Proof sketches of the theorems can be 
found in the Appendix. 
2 POSSIBLE WORLD PARTITION 
SEQUENCES 
The basic structure of our framework is based on pos­
sible worlds and an ordering we call a partition se� 
quence placed on sets of possible worlds. In a possible 
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world structure, each world corresponds to a possible 
scenario of the actual world. There is only one real 
world, but we do not have enough information to de­
termine exactly which world it is. Thus, we have a set 
of worlds each of which satisfies all the constraints and 
knowledge we have of the real world. 
Although we cannot rule out for sure any of these 
worlds that are consistent with the current informa­
tion, there is sometimes a bias on the worlds so that 
some worlds are considered a more "suitable" model 
of the real world than others. The measure of "suit­
ableness" of a possible world varies from formalism to 
formalism. Defaults, probability, and possibility are 
some of the measures that have been proposed. Many 
of the formalisms provide some justifications as to how 
the bias is arrived at, but for our purposes here, it suf­
fices to note each bias satisfies certain constraints (such 
as the three axioms for probability) which we need to 
capture in order to characterize the formalism. 
We can partition the worlds and order the resulting 
classes by considering their biases. Worlds that are 
suitable to the same extent are grouped into the same 
class, and its place in the partition sequence is deter­
mined by the bias of the worlds in the class relative to 
those in other classes. 
2.1 NOTATION 
Let .C be a standard propositional language, M.C be a 
standard propositional modal language, and P be the 
finite set of propositional constants in .C and M.C. We 
denote the (non-modal) provability operator by 1-. For 
any set of well formed formulas S -; .C, we denote by 
Th(S) the set of well formed formulas provable from 
S by propositional logic; that is, Th(S) == { ¢ : S f­
¢}. Let l.. and T be the contradiction and tautology 
symbols. 
Definition 1 Given a set of elements W, a partition 
sequence of W is a tuple (Wo, ... , W1), l � 1, such 
that the elements {W; : W; ¥0} forms a partition1 of 
w. 
Definition 2 A possible world partition sequence P 
is a triple {{W0, ... , W1), m, !), where {1} W == U; W; 
is an exhaustive set of possible worlds, each of which 
corresponds to a different interpretation of the propo­
sitional constants in P. The tuple {Wo, ... , W1) con­
stitutes a partition sequence of W. [2} The truth as­
signment function m is a junction from P x W into 
the truth values {0, 1}. {3} The weight function f is a 
function from W to the set of real numbers R. 
The valuation function Vp of the possible world par­
tition sequence P is constructed from m in the usual 
1 A partition of a set S is a set of non-empty sets 
St, .. . , Sn, such that U, S; = S, and S; n Si = 0, for 
i =/:- j. 
way. Note that some of the W; 's may be empty, but ev­
ery possible world with a distinct truth assignment for 
the propositional constants has to be included in one of 
the classes. Also, the order of the classes in a partition 
sequence is significant, For example, { (W0, W1), m, f/ 
is distinct from ((W1, W0), m, f), as the order of the 
classes in a partition sequence reflects the relative mag­
nitude of bias of the worlds in the different classes. 
The weight function f denotes the quantitative bias on 
each world. In the cases when f does not play a role 
in determining the results we are interested in, such as 
when the bias is induced by qualitative default rules, 
f may be omitted. (We can assume that f(w) == 1 for 
all w E W if not specified.) 
As a shorthand notation in examples, each world w 
is denoted by an ordered pair (S, f(w)/, such that S 
is the set of propositional constants or their negations 
that are true in that world, and f(w) is the weight 
assigned to the world. For example, ( {p, •q} , 0 .2) rep­
resents a world in which p is true but q is false, and 
the weight is 0.2. Again, f(w) may be omitted, and 
the world ( {p, -,q}, 1) would be denoted by {p, •q} in 
some cases. Similarly, a possible world partition se­
quence can be denoted simply by (Wo, .. . , W1), where 
each class Wi is a set of possible world ordered pairs. 
3 OVERVIEW OF SOME 
FORMALISMS 
Let us briefly summarize the preliminary terminology 
and machinery of a few of the formalisms to uncertain 
reasoning. These include default logic, autoepistemic 
logic, probabilistic conditioning and thresholding, and 
possibility theory. 
3.1 DEFAULT LOGIC [Reiter, 1980} 
Definition 3 A default rule is an expression of the 
form o:M,61, .. . ,MiJ,., where o:, f3t, ... , f3n and 1 are well "I 
formed formulas of .C. A default theory D. is an or-
dered pair (D, F}, where D is a set of default rules and 
F is a set of well formed formulas (facts) of C. 
Intuitively, a default rule a:M(?1 , ... ,M,B.. represents "I 
that if o: is provable, and •f31, ... , •f3n is each not 
provable, then we by default assert that 1 is true. For 
a default theory D. == (D, F), the known facts about 
the world constitute F, and a theory extended from 
F by applying the default rules in D is known as an 
extension of Ll., defined as follows. 
Definition 4 Let .6. ::::: {D, F} be a default theory over 
the language .C, and E be a subset of .C. r( E) is the 
smallest set satisfying the following three properties. 
[1} F -; r(E), [2} r(E) == Th(r(E)), and {3} For 
every default rule "''Mt31 � ,M!3n E D, if o: E r( E), 
and •f31, .. . , •f3n .;_ E, then 1 E r(E). 
E is an extension of 6. iff E is a fixed point of the 
operator r, that is, E = r(E). 
3.2 AUTOEPISTEMIC LOGIC 
Given a set of premises A � M£, an autoepistemic 
theory [Moore, 1985; Moore, 1984] T � M£ is a set of 
modal formulas meant to be a set of beliefs of an agent 
when reflecting upon A. The principal modal operator 
of autoepistemic logic is L, where L¢ is interpreted as 
that ¢ is believed. The belief set of an ideal agent is 
called a stable expansion, defined as follows. 
Definition 5 Let A � M£ be a set of premises and 
T � M £ be an autoepistemic theory. 
• T is stable [Stalnaker, 1980] iff {1] if O.t, . .. , O.n E 
T, and O.t, ... ,O.n f-- /3, then /3 E T, {2} if a. E T, 
then La. E T, and {3} if a.¢ T, then ..,La- E T. 
• T is grounded in A iff every formula of T is 
included in the tautological consequences of A U 
{La- : a. E T }  U {-,La : a ¢ T}. 
T is a stable expansion of A iff (1] A � T, (2} T is 
stable, and {3} T is grounded in A. 
One useful property of stability is that each stable au­
toepistemic theory is uniquely determined by its ker­
nel, the set of non-modal formulas in the theory. Thus, 
we only need to specify the kernel when we refer to sta­
ble theories. 
Konolige [Konolige, 1988; Konolige, 1989] showed that 
in the modal system K45, every well formed formula 
of M£ is equivalent to a formula of the normal form 
..,La.VLf3t V ... VL/3n VI, where a, f3t, . . . , f3n, 1 are all 
non-modal formulas, and any of a, /31, . . . , f3n may be 
absent2. We assume that all autoepistemic formulas 
are given in an equivalent normal form La A --,L/31 A 
... A --,Lf3n ----* 1 in our discussion. 
3.3 PROBABILISTIC CONDITIONING 
AND THRESHOLDING 
A probability function Pr is characterized by the fol­
lowing three axioms3. For any events E1 and E2 in 
the field of S, [1] 0 � Pr(E1) � 1, [2] Pr(S) = 1, and 
[3] Pr(Et u E2) = Pr(E1 ) + Pr(E2) if E1 n E2 = 0. 
We focus on two types of probability operations, con­
ditioning and thresholding. Pr( 1jJ I ¢), the probabil-
ity of 1jJ conditioned on ¢, is given by P�:;ci> when 
Pr(¢) f= 0. This quantity can be computed for any 
·pair of formulas ¢ and 1/J as long as the probability of 
¢is positive. However, the conditional probabilities of 
2Note that the non-modal disjunct -y has to be present, 
and thus the normal form of the formula La is La V ...L. 
3It suffices to specify the third property as finite ad­
ditivity instead of the more general countable additivity, 
since we are considering only a finite space. 
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interest are typically those computed in response to a 
change of Pr( ¢) to 1. The probabilities of all formulas 
are then updated to take into account this change. 
Thresholding is the process of accepting statements 
whose probability values exceed a certain threshold. 
This can be taken as a form of generalized condition­
ing. In regular conditioning, the conditional probabil­
ity is computed when Pr( ¢) changes to 1. Thresh­
olding imposes a weaker requirement4: accept ¢ if 
Pr( ¢) ;::: 1 - c It provides an explanation of how we 
come to ignore certain improbable events, such as my 
ducks suffocating due to all air molecules simultane­
ously rushing to the far end of the cage. The proba­
bility of this scenario is smaller than any reasonable E, 
and so we take it as practically false5. 
Definition 6 The probability of 1jJ thresholdcd at t: wrt 
(¢t, . . . ,¢n), n;::: 1, denoted by Pr,(1j! I (¢t, ... ,¢n)), 
is Pr('tf I ¢1, ... ,¢n) iff for 1 � i � n, Pr(¢, I 
¢1 > • • • , if'>i-d ;::: 1 - E. 
Note that the effective probability space is shrinking. 
After ¢1 is thresholded, we only consider the space in 
which ¢1 is true in future computations, and the re­
vised probability of all formulas 1jJ becomes Pr( 1jJ I ¢1), 
which becomes Pr( 1jJ I ¢1, ¢2, . .. ) as more formulas are 
thresholded. Since in general Pr( 1jJ I ¢1, . .. , ¢k) f= 
Pr(1jl I r/Jt, .. . , ¢k, rPk+t), each of the ¢i 's to be thresh­
olded is required to have a probability that is above 
threshold at the time it is treated. Also note that a 
set of formulas may be thresholded in multiple ways, 
depending on the specific formula picked at each stage. 
3.4 POSSIBILITY THEORY 
Definition 7 The possibility measure II and neces­
sity measure N satisfy the following axioms (Zadeh, 
1978; Dubois and Prade, 1988]. For any formulas ¢ 
and 1j!, (1} II(...L) = N(...L) = 0, (2] II(T) = N(T) = 1, 
(3} IT(¢ V 1jl) = max(II(¢), IT('I/J)), and (4/ N(¢ t\ 1j!) = 
min(N(¢),N(1jl)). The standard measures in addition 
bears the relation N(¢) = 1- IT(-,¢). 
We consider only a simplified version of possibility 
here. The underlying concepts are crisp (each propo­
sition is either totally true or totally false), but we 
do not have sufficient information to determine with 
complete confidence one way or the other. Also the 
knowledge base is coherent, in the sense that for any 
formula ¢, at least one of the necessity values N ( ¢) and 
N(-,¢) is 0. We cannot have assertions that simulta­
neously support the necessity of a set of outcomes and 
its negation6. 
4The f: in the threshold does not tend to 0, as in f­
semantics [Adams, 1975; Pearl, 1989], but is assumed to 
be fixed, although it can vary with context. 
5Note that a statement¢ is taken to be false if Pr(¢) � 
€, not if Pr(¢) < 1-£. 
6This is the basic scenario. Possibility theory stems 
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4 SPECIFIC PARTITION 
SEQUENCES 
Now we show how the formalisms described in the pre­
vious section can be characterized using the possible 
world partition sequence framework. 
4.1 DEFAULT PARTITION SEQUENCE 
Definition 8 A possible world partition sequence P = 
( (W0, ... , W1), m) is a default partition sequence for a 
default theory � = (D, F) iff it satisfies the following 
properties. 
1. Wo ={wE Ui Wi: Vp(F,w) = DV. 
2. For each Wi, 0 < i < l, there exists a default rule 
a:M,6t �· ,M,cln E D, such that {1} Vp ( o:, w) = 1 
for all wE wi, ... , WI, [2} 3w!, ... ,Wn E WI such 
that Vp(f3J,W!) = 1, . . . ,Vp(f3n,Wn) = 1, and {3} 
Wi = {w � Wo, ... , Wi-1: Vp(r, w) = 0}. 
3. For all default rules a M,01 � .. ,M,cJ, E D, if 
Vp(o:, w) = 1 for all w E W1, and :lw1, . . . , Wn E 
W1 such that Vp(f3!, w!) = 1, . . . , Vp(f3n, Wn) = 1, 
then Vp('Y,w) = 1 for all wE Wt. 
Theorem 9 A set of formulas E is an extension of a 
default theory � = (D, F} iff there is a default parti­
tion sequence P = ((W0, ... , W1), m) for�. such that 
E is the set of formulas{¢: Vp(q),w) = 1, Vw E Wt}. 
A default partition sequence captures the successive 
selection of possible worlds by the default rules. The 
first class Wo consists of all those worlds that are 
not consistent with the given facts F. At each level 
0 < i < l, an applicable default rule is chosen, and 
all the worlds that are not consistent with its default 
conclusion "'( are grouped into class Wi, which are ig­
nored when further default rules are applied. Thus, 
the worlds in the tail of the sequence, Wi+l ... Wt, are 
the worlds that are still "suitable by default" after i 
default rules have been appl ied. No more default rule 
is applicable to the final class W1, and so it consists of 
all the possible worlds of the extension. 
The mapping from default partition sequences to de­
fault extensions is many-to-one. There can be more 
than one partition sequence for each extension, de­
pending on, for instance, the order in which default 
rules are applied when multiple rules are applicable at 
some stage. Two different default partition sequences 
are isomorphic iff their last class wl are identical. 
from fuzzy set theory, and can be applied to fuzzy sets as 
well as to crisp sets. See also [Dubois et a.l., 1994] for the 
treatment of partially inconsistent knowledge bases. 
7We assume here that the set of formulas F = 
{h, h, . . . } is equivalent to the single formula F = h 1\ 
h 1\ .. . . 
The following examples illustrate the correspondence 
between extensions of a default theory and their de­
fault partition sequences. 
Example 10 D = { :Mp :M�p p:Mq} and F = 0. p ' �p ' q ' 
There are two extensions, E1 Th( { •P} ) 
and E2 = Th( {p, q}), which can be character­
ized by the two default partition sequences [1] 
{0, Wu, W12), where W11 = { {p, q}, {p, •q} } , W12 = 
{ {•p, q}, {-.p, -.q} }, and [2] (0, w21, w22, w23), where 
W2 1 = { { ·P, q}, { -.p, -.q}}, W22 {{p, -.q} }, W23 
{{p,q}}. D 
Example 11 � = (D, 0), where D = { '�P}. 
This default theory has no extension. To construct 
any default partition sequence for �. W0 has to be 0, 
since F is empty. There are two possible cases. [1] 
{p} E Wt. But then -.p has to be true in all worlds 
in W1 according to condition 3 in Definition 8. [2] 
{p} � w,. Then the default rule is not applicable , 
and we cannot construct intermediate classes for {p} 
according to condition 2. D 
4.2 AUTOEPISTEMIC PARTITION 
SEQUENCE 
Definition 12 A possible world partition sequence 
P = ((Wa, . . . ,W,),m) is an autoepistemic partition 
sequence for A s;;; MC iff it satisfies the following prop­
erties. 
1. Wo = 0. 
2. For each W;, 0 < i < l, there exists a for­
mula La: 1\ -.Lf31 1\ . . . 1\ -.Lf3n -+ 1 E A 
such that [1} Vp(o:,w) = 1 for all w E Wt, 
{2} ?Jw1, .. . , Wn E W, such that Vp( -.,81, w!) 
1, . .. , Vp( •f3n, Wn) = 1 and {3} W; = { W � 
Wa, . . .  , W;-1: Vp("'Y,w) = 0}. 
3. For all formulas La: 1\ •L!'h 1\ ... 1\ -.Lf3n -+ 
1 E A, if Vp(a,w) = 1 for all w E Wt, 
and 3w1, . . . ,Wn E W1 such that Vp(-.,B1,w!) = 
1, ... , Vp( -.f3n, Wn) = 1, then Vp(i, w) = 1 for all 
wEW1. 
Theorem 13 An autoepistemic theory T is a con­
sistent stable expansion of a set of premises A iff 
there is an autoepistemic partition sequence P = 
((Wo, .. . , Wt}, m) for A, such that w, f:. 0 and Tis the 
stable set characterized by the kernel { ¢ : Vp ( ¢, w) = 
1, Vw E Wt }. 
The definition of an autoepistemic partition sequence 
is very similar to that of a default partition sequence, 
with differences parallel to those occurring in their 
fixed point formulations [Teng, 1996]8 In particular, 
8The first condition in Definition 12 is by no means 
essential. It is added so that the parallel between default 
in item 2 of Definition 12, a has to be true only in the 
worlds in the last class W1, while in the correspond­
ing condition in Definition 8, a is evaluated against all 
classes W;, ... , Wt. 
Example 14 A = {Lp -t p, -,Lp -t q}. 
There are two stable expansions, T1 with the ker­
nel {p} and T2 with the kernel { q}. An au­
toepistemic partition sequence corresponding to T1 is 
(0, Wu, W12), with W11 = {{-,p,q},{-,p, •q}}, W12 = 
{ {p, q}, {p, •q}}, and Lp -+ p is used for the par­
tition. A partition sequence corresponding to T2 is 
(0, w21' w22), with w21 = { {p, -,q}, { -,p, -,q}}, w22 = 
{ {p, q}, { -.p, q}}, and the formula -.Lp -+ q is used for 
this partition. o 
Example 15 A= {-.Lp-+ q,•q}. 
A has no stable expansion. To construct any autoepis­
temic partition sequence, W1 can only contain one or 
both of the worlds {p, •q},{-,p, -,q}, since •q E A 
and by condition 3 of Definition 12, •q is true in all 
worlds in W1• If W1 = {{p,-.q}}, there is no formula 
that can be used to construct a class for { 'P, -.q} 
according to condition 2. If W1 = { { 'P, -,q}} or 
{ {p, -.q}, { -.p, -,q}}, then q needs to be true in all 
worlds in W1 by condition 3. 0 
4.3 CONDITIONAL AND THRESHOLD 
PARTITION SEQUENCES 
The sample space can be represented as a set of pos­
sible worlds L\ = (W, m, f). For example, a sample 
space for fair coin tosses is {({h},0.5),({-,h},0.5)}, 
where the proposition h stands for heads. 
Definition 16 A possible world partition sequence 
P = ((Wo, ... , Wn}, m,!} is a conditional probability 
partition sequence for a sample space ll. = (W, m, f) 
conditioned on a sequence of formulas (¢t, ... , rPn) 1 
n 2: 1, iff (1} Uo<i<n W; = W, and [2} W; = {w fl. 
Wo, ... , W;-1 : Vp-(¢';+t, w) = 0} for 0::; i < n. 
Theorem 17 Given a sample space ll. = (W, m, f), 
Pr( 'ljiJ ¢1, ... , ¢n) = r iff there is a conditional proba-
bility partition sequence P = ((Wo, . . . , Wn),m,f) for 
ll. conditioned on (¢I, . . . , rPn) 1 and 
l: ... Ew .. •Velv•.wl=l f(w) = here "\"" f(w) ...t 0. 2:: j(w) r, W L.,w EWn T �rEWn . 
Example 18 ll. = {w1,w2, w3,w4}, where Wt = 
({p,q},0.2), W2 = {{p,....,q}, 0.3), W3 = ({-,p,q},0.1), 
W4 = ({-,p, -.q},0.4). 
A conditional probability partition sequence for ll. con­
ditioned on {p-+ q,pVq) is ({w2}, {w4},{w1, w3}). 
Th h P ( I V ) _ f(w!) _ 2 en we ave r p P-+ q,p q - f(wl)+J(w3) - 3• 
and Pr(q I p-+ q p V q) = f(wi)+f(w3) = 1. 0 > f(wi)+f(wJ) 
and autoepistemic partition sequences can be brought out 
more clearly. 
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The conditioning probability partition sequence is in­
cremental in the sense that we can build a partition 
sequence conditioned on ( ¢1, . . . , rPk+l) based on a par­
tition sequence conditioned on (¢1, ... , ¢k). It is also 
persistent [Driscoll et al. , 1989] since we can retrieve 
Pr( '1/J I ¢1, . .. , ¢k) from a partition sequence condi­
tioned on {¢I,· . . , r/Jk, rPk+I, · · .). 
Now we turn to thresholding. 
Definition 19 A possible world partition sequence 
P == {(Wo, .. . , Wn), m, f) is a threshold probability 
partition sequence for a sample space ll. = (W, m, f) at 
E wrt (¢1, ... , ¢n) iff (1 j P is a conditional probability 
partition sequence for ll. conditioned on ( ¢1, ... , ¢n), 
d ["} LwEW· j(w) J O < · an 
"- l:wEW, ...... Wn f(w) :sf. 
OT - � < n. 
Condition 2 gives an equivalent condition for c/li+ 1 to 
be above threshold: the weighted proportion of worlds 
in W; (those worlds in which ¢i+1 is false) among all 
worlds in W;, . . . , W n is no greater than E. 
Theorem 20 Given a sample space ll. = {W, m, f), 
Pr,('ljll {¢1 , ... ,r/Jn)) = riff there is a threshold proba­
bility partition sequence P = ( (W0, ... , Wn), m, f) for 
"\"" j(w) 
A t t (A. A, ) d L.,wEW,.,Vp(,J>,wl=l _ uat.wr '1'1,··· ,'/'n,an I: f(w) -r, 
where LwEW, f(w) -1- 0. 
wE_lV,k 
4.3.1 The Lottery Paradox: An Example 
The lottery paradox [Kyburg, 1961] is as follows. 100 
tickets have been sold, but only one will win. Each 
ticket has an equal but small chance, and thus can be 
regarded as practically losing. However, if we apply 
this train of thought to all tickets, we end up reject­
ing alllOO tickets as losing, which is inconsistent with 
the premise that one of the tickets will win. We can 
formulate the lottery paradox using thresholding. 
Example 21 Let ll. = (W, m, f), where w; 
( {....,PI, · · · , ....,Pi-t, Pi, 'Pi+ I > · · · , 'Ptoo}, 1�0 ) , and W = 
{wl, ... ,w1oo}9. P = (Wo,Wt,W2), where Wo = 
{wt}, WI == {w2}, w2 = {w3, . . . l Wtoo}, is a thresh­
old probability partition sequence for ll. at E = 919 wrt 
('PI, 'P2). We can check that P satisfies the condi­
tions in Definition 19. [1] P is a conditional prob­
ability partition sequence conditioned on { •PI, •P2). 
[2] L,.,EWo f(w) _ f(wl) __ 1 Sim-" f( ) - f(wl)+ ... + j(w10o) - 100 · L.,,.,EWo.Wl.W2 W 
'l l L,.,EWJ f(w) = f(w2) :::: 1 B th 1 ar y, " f(w) f(w2)+ ... +f(w1oo) gg· 0 �.,,r:_wl,w2 
of these proportions are ::; E. 
Thus, we can derive Pr(p1) = Pr(p2 ) = 0, and 
Pr(p; ) = 918 for all i � 3, since Pt and P2 are both 
9 All other worlds have a weight of 0, and thus can be 
safely ignored since they do not contribute to the weight 
of any set. 
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false in all the worlds in w2' and for each Pi I i � 3, 
there is exactly one world among the 98 in the last 
class W2 at which p; is true. 0 
Each proposition p; corresponds to the statement 
"ticket i wins", and each world w; corresponds to the 
situation in which ticket i wins and all others lose. In 
the partition sequence constructed in the example, the 
first and second tickets are deemed losing, but nothing 
certain is concluded about the remaining tickets. In 
fact, for any two arbitrary tickets i and j, we can con­
struct a threshold probability partition sequence for D. 
at 919 wrt ( -.p;, -.pj), and tickets i and j are losing in 
this situation. 
Note that the last class W2 cannot be further parti­
tioned at t = 919 by thresholding on additional formu­
las, since if we were to split W2 into two non-empty 
1 WI d W' l:,.,EW� f(w) . 1 0.01 ( · c asses 2 an 3, '\"' f(w) IS at east 0_98 as i-.Ju,EW� . W� 
there are 98 worlds in W2), which is greater than E. 
Thus, the threshold 1 - E represents the limit to what 
we consider as "practically true". With E = -ifg, we are 
willing to say that a person who holds 2, but not 3, 
tickets will lose, while with E = 160, we only commit 
to saying any one ticket will lose. The uncomfort­
able conclusion that all tickets will lose occurs when 
E = L This allows us to threshold, and take as true, 
any formula with probability � 0, which amounts to 
all formulas in L, and thus the inconsistency. To avoid 
the lottery paradox, we only need to set E < 1. 
4.4 POSSIBILITY PARTITION 
SEQUENCE 
Consider a set of possibilistic statements S 
{(S1,r1), ... , (Sn, rn)} , n � 1, where S; ¥-0 is a set of 
well formed formulas of L, and II(¢) = r; for all <P E S;. 
Without loss of generality, we assume r1 < . . . < r n. 
Definition 22 A possible world partition sequence 
P = ( (Wo, ... , Wn) , m, f) is a possibility partition se­
quence for a set of consistent possibilistic statements 
S = {(Sl,ri), . . . ,(Sn,rn)} iff[l} For O S: i < n, 
W; = U¢ESi+l Uq,, where Uq, = {w fj_ Wo, .. . 'wi-1 : 
Vp(¢,w) = 1} and all Uq, =!= 0 unless r; = 0, and 
[2} LwEW; f(w) = ri+l - r;, assuming r0 = 0 and 
rn+I = 1. 
Note that the U q, 's  need not be disjoint (but all must 
be non-empty). Only the "meta"-classes W;'s formed 
from their unions need to be disjoint. Also the weights 
of individual worlds can vary as long as the total 
weight in each class satisfies the possibilistic con­
straints. 
Theorem 23 Given a consistent set of possibilis­
tic statements S = {(Sl,rt), ... ,(Sn,rn)}, II(¢) = 
r iff there is a possibility partition sequence P = 
((Wo, ... , Wn), m, f) for S, and LwEWo,. ,w, f(w) = 
r, where i = max({k: :lw E Wk,VP(</>,w) = 1}). 
If there is no world w such that V p ( ¢, w) = 1, then 
II(¢)= 0. 
In a possibility partition sequence, the possible worlds 
are divided into classes W0, ... , W n of increasing pos­
sibility. Formulas that are true in any of the worlds 
in Wi, but not true in any world in W;+ 1, ... , H'n, are 
possible to the same extent. The weights of all the 
worlds add up to 1, and so the possibility of formu­
las that are true in any world in the final class W n is 
always 1. The order of the classes in the partition se­
quence represents the successive grouping of worlds in 
accordance to how possible they are. W0 contains the 
worlds that are least possible, and Wn contains those 
worlds that are most possible. 
Example 24 S = { ({p J\ q)}, 0.3), ({p}, 0.7) }. 
P = ((Wo, W1, Wz),m,f) is a possibility partition 
sequence for S, where W0 = { ({p,q},0.3) }, W1 = 
{ ({p, .. q}, 0.4}}, w2 == { ({ -.p, q}, k), ({ •p,-.q}, 0.3-
k) } with 0 S: k S 0.3. 
We can verify that II(p) = 0.7, as stated inS. pis true 
in a world in W1 but not true in any of the worlds in 
W2, and therefore II(p) is given by 0.3 + 0.4 = 0.7. 
II ( q) = II ( •q) = 1, since q and -.q each is true in some 
(different) world in W2. This amounts to saying that 
we have no information regarding the truth of q. D 
Example 25 S = { ({p},0.3/, ({pi\ q}, 0.5) }. 
S is inconsistent, since on one hand il(p) = 0.3 as 
stated in S, but we can also derive II(p) by noting 
that II(p) = II((p J\ q) v (p A -,q)) � II(p A q) = 
0.5. To construct a possibility partition sequence, we 
would have p = ( (Wo' Wt' Wz) I m, n for 5, where 
Wo = {({p,q},ko),({p,-.q},0.3-ko)}, W1 =0, W2 = 
{({-,p, q}, k2), ({ -,p, -.q}, 0.5-k2) }, with 0 S: ko S: 0.3 
and 0 S: k2 S: 0.5. The set Up11q for constructing W1 
is empty, which does not satisfy condition l of Defini­
tion 22. Note also that the weights of all the worlds in 
P do not add up to l. 0 
5 CONCLUSION 
We presented a framework for unifying formalisms of 
uncertain reasoning . The framework is based on an 
ordered partition of possible worlds we call partition 
sequences. A partition sequence corresponds to our 
intuitive notion of biasing towards certain possible 
scenarios when we are uncertain of the actual situa­
tion. The constraints for constructing allowable parti­
tion sequences reflect the characterizing way the bias 
is assigned in a formalism. We showed that default 
logic, autoepistemic logic, probabilistic conditioning 
and thresholding, and possibility theory can be suc­
cessfully assimilated into this framework. As a side 
point, we also showed how the lottery paradox can 
be avoided by probabilistic thresholding, and how it 
can be expressed as a threshold probability partition 
sequence. 
The semantics we provide is similar in flavor to 
Shoham's preference semantics [Shoham, 1988]. In­
stead of imposing a preference ordering on models, 
we impose an ordering on equivalence classes of pos­
sible worlds. A possible world partition sequence 
(Wo, ... , Wn) can be regarded in a broad sense as a 
preference relation of the models Mi = Ui<k<n Wk so 
that M0 C . .. C Mn, where M; C M1 is Interpreted 
as that M1 is preferred over M;. 
Our work presented here provides a common frame­
work in which we can characterize various formalisms 
to uncertain reasoning. We consider it the ground 
work for building an integrated system with a well 
founded semantics on the mechanism of combining 
knowledge bases of multiple formats. 
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APPENDIX: PROOFS OF 
THEOREMS 
We append here sketches of proofs of the theorems 
presented in this paper. 
Theorem 9 A set of formulas E is an extension of a 
default theory ll = (D, F) iff there is a default parti­
tion sequence P = ((Wo, . . . , W1), m) for ll, such that 
E is the set of formulas {4>: Vp(q'>, w) = 1, \fw E Wt}. 
Proof ( ==>) Suppose E is an extension of a de­
fault theory ll = (D, F), that is, E = f( E). We 
need to show that there is a default partition sequence 
P = ( (Wo, ... , W1), rn) for ll, such that E = {¢ : 
Vp(q'>,w) = 1, \fw E Wl}. 
Let W1 be the set of all possible worlds in which E is 
true. Condition 3 in Definition 8 is satisfied as a con­
sequence of condition 3 of Definition 4. In addition, 
we can always construct W0 according to condition 1, 
and order the remaining worlds into the sequence 
(W1, .. . , W rn ) according to condition 2 of Definition 8, 
until W m cannot be further partitioned. Now we only 
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need to show that P = ( (Wo , . . . , Wm- i ,  Wt ) ,  m) is a 
partition sequence, that is, W m = W1 • We proceed in 
two steps. 
The first two items in condition 2 of Definition 8 entails 
the antecedent in condition 3 of Definition 4, and so 
1 E E and Vp('y, w) = 1 for all w E Wt . Therefore 
none of the worlds in W1 can be grouped into any of 
the W; 's , i < m, and W1 � Wm . 
Now we show that it is not the case that W1 c W m . 
Assume the contrary. Let E' = { ¢ : V p ( ¢, w) = 
1 ,  Vw E W= } · Recall that Wt is a maximal set for 
E, and the additional worlds in Wm makes E' c E. 
E' also satisfies the three conditions in Definition 4 as 
a candidate for r(E), which contradicts that E is an 
extension and thus the smallest such candidate . 
( <== ) Suppose there is a default partition sequence 
P = ( (Wo , . . . , Wt ) , m) for .6. = (D, F) .  We need to 
show that E = { ¢ : Vp (¢, w) = 1, Vw E Wt } is an 
extension of .6., that is, E = r(E) . 
E satisfies the three conditions in Definition 4, and 
thus r(E) � E. Now let Ei = { ¢  : Vp(¢, w) = 
1 ,  Vw E W; , . . .  , WI } .  We show E; � r(E) for 
i > 0. E1 = F � r(E) . Now assume E, � r(E) . 
Ei+l = Th(E, U {r} ) , where there is a default rule 
a:M/31 � . . ,M/3" E D, such that [1] V p (a: ,  w) = 1 for 
all w E wi ,  . . . ' Wt ,  and [2] :Jwl ' .. . ' Wn E Wt such 
that Vp (,81 , wl ) = 1 ,  . . . , Vp (,Bn , Wn ) = 1 .  From [1] we 
have a: E r(E), and from [2] •,81, . . . , -.,Bn � E. Thus, 
1 E r(E) according to condition 3 of Definition 4, and 
Ei+l � r(E). In particular, E = E1 � r(E). 0 
Theorem 13 An autoepistemic theory T is a con­
sistent stable expansion of a set of premises A iff 
there is an autoepistemic partition sequence P = 
( (Wo , . . . , Wt ) ,  m) for A ,  such that Wt =f. 0 and T is the 
stable set characterized by the kernel { ¢ : Vp ( ¢, w) = 
1 ,  Vw E Wt } .  
Proof We make use of the following Lemma. 
Lemma 1 3 . 1  {Teng, 1996] Let A � M.C be a set 
of formulas (premises) in normal form and T be a 
consistent subset of M.C. Sl(T) is the set with the 
smallest kernel satisfying the following two proper­
ties. {1} Sl (T) is stable, and {2} For every formula 
La: 1\ •L,81 A . . . A •L,Bn -+ '"Y E A, if a: E T, and 
fJ1 , . . . , f3n � T, then r E D(T) . T is a consistent sta­
ble expansion of A iffT is a fixed point of the operator 
Sl, that is, T = Sl (T) . 
The proof for autoepistemic partition sequences fol­
lows closely the one for default partition sequences 
(Theorem 9), with obvious adjustments corresponding 
to the differences between the fixed point formulations 
of the two logics . D 
Theorem 17 Given a sample space .6. = (W, m, f) , 
Pr( 1/J I ¢1,  . . . , ¢n)  = r iff there is a conditional proba-
bility partition sequence P = ( ( W0 , . . .  , W n ) ,  m, f) for 
.6. conditioned on (¢1 , . . .  , ¢n) , and 
E f(w) uo E Wn o Yp( ,P . uo ) = l 
_ h '\' f( ) __j_ 0 
t j(w) - r, W ere L..wEWn W r . w E W,. 
Proof This theorem follows from the definition of 
conditional probabilities. D 
Theorem 20 Given a sample space .6. = (W, m, f),  
Pre ( 1/J I (¢1 , . . .  , ¢n ) ) = r iff there is a threshold proba­
bility partition sequence P = ( (W0 ,  . . .  , Wn) ,  m, f) for 
/1. at & wrt (A-. rf.. ) d E ... E Wn o Vp( ,P . w ) = l f(w) -Ll. , '1'1 • . . . , 'f'n , an 
2.: 
- r 
w E Wn J(w) 
1 
where EwEW,. f(w) =f. 0 .  
Proof This theorem follows from Theorem 1 7. Con­
dition 2 in Definition 19 corresponds to the constraint 
Pr(¢; I ¢1 , . . . , ¢;- I )  � 1 - t: for 1 � i � n in Defini­
tion 6. D 
Theorem 23 Given a consistent set of possibilis­
tic statements S = { {Sl , rl ) ,  . . . , (Sn , rn) } ,  11(¢) = 
r iff there is a possibility partition sequence P = 
( (Wo ,  . . .  , Wn), m, f) for S, and EwE Wo,  . . . , w, f(w) = 
r, where i = max( {k  : :Jw E Wk, Vp(¢, w) = 1} ) .  
If there is no world w such that Vp (¢, w )  = 1 ,  then 
11(¢) = 0. 
Proof ( ==>) Given a consistent set of possi­
bilistic statements S = { (S1 , r1 ) , . . . , (Sn , rn) } ,  we 
can construct a possibility partition sequence P = 
( (Wo ,  . . . , Wn) , m , j) for S. We show that Uq, =f. 0 
unless r; = 0 in condition 1 of Definition 22. If ¢ is 
inconsistent, then ri must be 0 by Definition 7. Now 
suppose ¢ E S;+l is consistent but Uq, = 0 .  That is, 
the worlds in which ¢ is true are all in W0 , . . .  , W;-t . 
In other words, there is a formula 1/J = 1/.11 V . . .  V 1/Jk 
such that each 1/Ji E So U . . .  u S; , and 1/J 1- ¢. We 
have 11(1/.1) = max(11(1/ll ) ,  . . .  , II (1/lk ) ) ,  which is � r, .  
However, 1jJ can be rewritten as 1/;1 v . . . V 1/Jk V ¢ ,  and 
we have II( 1/J) = max(II( 'lj;I) ,  ... , II( 1/Jk) ,  II(¢>) ) ,  which 
is � II(¢) = ri+t > r; , a contradiction. 
( <==) Suppose there is a possibility partition sequence 
P = ( (Wo ,  . . .  , W n) , m, f) for a set of possibilistic 
statements S = { (S1 , r1 ) ,  . . . , (Sn , rn ) } .  Clearly the 
possibility values derived by the theorem satisfies the 
requirements in Definition 7. In addition, the state­
ments in S have their intended possibility values . For 
a formula ¢ E S;+l ,  W; is the class with the highest 
index that contains worlds in which ¢ is true, and so 
11(¢) = EwEWo, . . .  , W; f(w) = (rl - 0) + (rz - ri ) + . . .  + 
(ri+t - r; )  = ri+l · D 
